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TAX LAW-THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: INTERPRETING THE 
"HASKELL AMENDMENT" TO 26 U.S.c. § 6103-DEFINING "RE­
TURN INFORMATION" 
INTRODUCTION 

In enacting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l Congress 
determined that there is need for the government to disclose the infor­
mation it possesses. This determination stemmed from two concerns:2 
first, individuals have a right of access to information possessed by the 
government;3 and second, disclosure of information to individuals will 
aid in preventing government abuse.4 The FOIA provides for nine 
exceptions to the general rule of disclosure.s Exception three of that 
Act exempts from disclosure those documents specifically exempt by 
1. 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1982). 
2. The FOIA was premised on the principle that the public has the right to know the 
workings of its government. Although this right is not enumerated in the Constitution it is 
embedded in our society. See O'Brien, Privacy and the Right 0/Access: Purposes & Para­
doxes 0/In/ormation Control, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 45 (1978). As O'Brien noted, "the dem­
ocratic theory assumes an informed citizenry and acknowledges that in principle the public 
has a right to know." Id. at 58. 
3. Id. 
4. The purpose of the FOIA is to protect an individual's right to obtain information 
about the government and its activities. Congress sought to "remedy the mischief of arbi­
trary and self-serving withholding by agencies which are not directly responsible to the 
people." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(footnote omitted). See generally Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 
1974); Montrose Chern. Corp. of Cal. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Weisberg v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 
(1974); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). The section reads in part: 

This section does not apply to matters that are­
(1) specifically authorized . . . by Executive order to be kept secret in the 

interest of national defense or foreign policy . . . ; 

(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practice of an agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... ; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 

person and privileged or confidential; 

(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be 

available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 

agency; 

(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
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other statutes.6 One statute which relies on exception three is 26 
U.S.C. § 6103, a non-disclosure provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.) relating to federal tax return information.7 
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 6103 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976.8 Prior to 1976, the I.R.C. provided for the disclosure of tax 
returns only in accordance with regulations approved by the President 
or under presidential order.9 This provision, however, resulted in well 
documented abuse by government entities. \0 The staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation detailed the reason for changing the law lD 
1976: 
The IRS has more information about more people than any 
(7) [some instances] where investigatory records are compiled for law 

enforcement purposes . . . ; 

(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports 
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, 
concerning wells. 
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person 
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this 
subsection. 
Id. 
6. The statute states that information must be disclosed unless it is "specifically ex­
empted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) requires that the 
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, 
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters 
to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 
7. Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Chamberlain v. 
Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979); Fruehauf Corp. v. 
IRS, 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977). 
8. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
9. I.R.C. § 6103(a)(2), prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1202. 
10. See Benedict & Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns-The Tension Between Gov­
ernment Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 942 n.5 (1979). 
For example, during the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the 
impeachment of President Nixon, it was revealed that the former President had 
requested and attempted to obtain, confidential information contained in income 
tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service allegedly for political and other 
purposes not authorized by law. President Nixon had also endeavored to cause 
income tax audits and investigations to be initiated and conducted in a discrimi­
natory manner. 
Id. (citing Statement of Information: Hearings Pursuant to H.R. 803 before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary. Book VII, Internal Revenue Service, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 368 
(1974); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRES­
IDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 141-45 (1974); 
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 830-31 (1975». 
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other agency in this country. Consequently, almost every other 
agency that has a need for information about U.S. citizens sought it 
from the IRS. However, in many cases the Congress had not specif­
ically considered whether the agencies which had access to tax in­
formation should have that access . . . . This, in tum, raised the 
question of whether the public's reaction to this possible abuse of 
privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country's 
very successful voluntary assessment system, which is the mainstay 
of the Federal tax system .... The Congress strove to balance the 
particular office or agency's need for the information involved with 
the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure 
upon the continuation of compliance with our country's voluntary 
tax assessment system. 11 
Section 6103 states the general rule of non-disclosure: "return 
and return information shall be confidential . . . except as authorized 
by this title. "12 "Return information" is defined in § 6103(b)(2) 
as: 
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his in­
come, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, li­
abilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over 
assessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is 
being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or 
11. Parnell, Right to Privacy and Administration of the Federal Tax Laws, 31 TAX 
LAW. 113, 119-20 (1970) (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT 314-15 (1976». 
12. 26 u.s.c. § 6103(a) (1982). Sections 6103(c) through § 6103(0) provide specific 
exceptions to this general rule of non-disclosure. The headings are: 
(c). Disclosure of return and return information to deSignee of taxpayer. 
(d). Disclosure to state tax officials. 
(e). Disclosure to persons having-material interest. 
(f). Disclosure to committees of -Congress. 
(g). Disclosure to President and certain other persons. 
(h). Disclosure to certain Federal officers or employees for purposes of tax 
administration. 
(i). Disclosure to Federal officers and employees for administration of Federal 
laws not relating to tax administration. 
(j). Statistical use. 
(k). Disclosure of certain returns and return information for tax 
administration purposes. 
(I). Disclosure of certain returns and return information for purposes other 
than tax administration. 
(m). Disclosure of taxpayer identity information. 
(n). Disclosure to certain other persons. 
(0). Disclosure of return and return information with respect to certain taxes. 
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processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared 
by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a re­
turn or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possi­
ble existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person 
under this title for any tax penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other 
imposition, or offense, and 
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file 
document relating to such written determination (as such terms are 
defined in section 611O(b» which is not open to public inspection 
under section 6110, but such term does not include data in a form 
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or in­
directly, a particular taxpayer. 13 
The italicized language of this definition is known as the Haskell 
amendment. 14 Several courts of appeals have interpreted the defini­
tion of "return information" and the language of the Haskell amend­
ment. ls In the 1987 term the United States Supreme Court will hear 
arguments in the Church of Scientology of California v. IRS case. 16 
The issue before the Court will be whether return information includes 
only information which identifies an individual taxpayer or all infor­
mation listed in § 6103(b)(2)(A). 
This note discusses the text, significance, and legislative history of 
§ 6103(b)(2) and describes and analyzes the three major cases discuss­
ing the definition of "return information."17 The analysis focuses on 
those portions of the opinions discussing the Haskell amendment's im­
pact on the definition of "return information." Finally, this note pro­
poses an interpretation of the Haskell amendment that satisfies the 
congressional intent in promulgating § 6103 and an analytical frame­
work which the Supreme Court could use in deciding Church of 
Scientology. 
I. THE STATUTE 
A. 26 u.s.c. § 6103 
The purpose of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 is to prevent disclosure of "re­
turn information" to persons who do not have a material interest in it, 
13. 26 U.S.c. § 6103(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
14. The amendment was proposed by, and named after, Senator Floyd K. Haskell 
(D) from Colorado. 
15. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987); King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982); Long v. IRS, 596 
F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). 
16. Church of SCientology, 792 F.2d 153. 
17. See supra note 15. 
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thereby protecting an individual's right of privacy.18 If tax informa­
tion requested under the FOIA is "return information," and the re­
quester does not have a materia1 interest in that information, that 
request will be denied. 19 However, if the IRS determines that the re­
quested information is not "return information" it is released pursuant 
to the FOIA, regardless of whether the requester's interest is 
material.20 
B. The Haskell Amendment 
The term "return information" is ambiguous largely due to the 
Haskell amendment, which states that "return information" "does not 
include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise 
identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."21 The phrase 
"in a form"22 can be interpreted to mean that "return information" 
may be disclosed if it is put in another form (e.g., statistica1 studies or 
other compilations of data)23 or that "return information" may be dis­
closed if it is disclosed in a manner that does not identify an 
individual.24 
1. Legislative History of the Haskell Amendment 
Senator Haskell of Colorado proposed the amendment to 
§ 6103(b)(2) in the closing days of deliberation on the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976.25 In response to the question26 whether the IRS could avoid 
18. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 463 F. 
Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
19. See. e.g., Heinsohn v. IRS, 553 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Savoie v. IRS, 
544 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. La. 1982); Watson v. IRS, 538 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 
20. The IRS determines whether requested documents contain "return information" 
thereby determining whether those documents are disclosable under the FOIA. If a re­
quester challenges this determination in court, the IRS has the burden of proving that the 
documents were exempt from disclosure. See generally Campbell v. Department of Health 
& Human Services, 682 F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268, 
1272-74 (8th Cir. 1980); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 997 (1974). 
21. 26 U.S.c. § 6103(b)(2)(B) (1982) (emphasis added). 
22. For further discussion of the ambiguous language see infra text accompanying 
notes 132-37. 
23. See Church of Scientology of Cal. V. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987); King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 1981). 
24. See generally Moody V. IRS, 654 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nuefeld V. IRS, 646 
F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Long V. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 965 (1970). 
25. 122 CONGo REC. S24,012 (1976) (statement by Sen. Haskell). 
26. This was the only question that concerned the substance of the proposed 
amendment. 
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disclosing statistical studies simply by adding identifying information, 
Senator Haskell stated: 
The purpose of this amendment is to insure that statistical studies 
and other compilations of data now prepared by the Internal Reve­
nue Service can continue to be subject to disclosure to the extent 
allowed under present law. Thus the Internal Revenue Service can 
continue to release for research purposes statistical studies and com­
pilations of data, such as the tax model, which do not identify indi­
vidual taxpayers. 
The definition of "return information" was intended to neither 
enhance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom of 
Information Act to statistical studies and compilations of data by 
the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, the addition by the Internal 
Revenue Service of easily deletable identifying information to the 
type of statistical study or compilation of data which under its cur­
rent practice, has been subject to disclosure, will not prevent disclo­
sure of such study or compilation under the newly amended section 
6103. In such an instance, the identifying information would be de­
leted and disclosure of the statistical study or compilation of data 
would be made. 
The amendment was passed by consent with no dissenting votes. 27 
Interpretation of the Haskell amendment has led to the inconsis­
tent application of the term "return information" by the Seventh, 
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals.28 The 
Ninth Circuit in Long v. IRS,29 the Seventh Circuit in King v. IRS,3° 
and the District of Columbia Circuit in Church ofScientology ofCali­
fornia v. IRS3) all agreed that information that identifies individual 
taxpayers is "return information." The disagreement among the 
courts centered on what "return information," if any, the Haskell 
27. 122 CONGo REC. S24,012 (1976) (statement by Sen. Haskell). Congress amended 
the Haskell amendment in 1981 by adding at the end of the sentence: 
Nothing in the preceding sentence or in any other provisions of law shall be con­
strued to require the disclosure of standards used or to be used for the selection of 
returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such stan­
dards, if the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seriously impair as­
sessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue laws. 
26 U.S.c. § 6103 (1982) (no change to § 6103(b)(2) will result from the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West Supp. 1986». 
28. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987); King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982); Long v. IRS, 596 
F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). 
29. Long, 596 F.2d 362. 
30. King, 688 F.2d 488. 
31. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d 153. 
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amendment exempts from the non-disclosure requirement of § 6103. 
Long held that all non-identifying "return information" is exempt 
from the non-disclosure requirement.32 King held that unless informa­
tion is specifically exempt under § 6103(b)(2)(A), non-identifying in­
formation may be disclosed but only as statistical data or 
compilations.33 Church ofScientology held that some non-identifying 
"return information" may be disclosed if it is reformulated.34 
II. THE CASES 
A. Long v. IRS and the "Identity Test" 
Bill and Susan Long requested that the IRS release source data 
from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).35 
The IRS released to the plaintiffs all statistical tabulations based on 
the TCMP but refused to disclose the requested source data. The 
source data is in the form of check sheets and data tapes. The data 
tapes include a taxpayer's social security number and all the financial 
information reported on his or her tax return. The check sheets con­
tain, in addition to a social security number and financial data, the 
taxpayer's name and address. 36 The plaintiffs brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
seeking access to data tapes and the check sheets necessary to interpret 
those tapes.37 The Longs requested that any identifying information 
be deleted before the source data was disclosed.38 The district court 
denied the plaintiffs access to the requested data.39 
The issue presented to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was 
whether TCMP source data constituted "return information."40 The 
32. Long, 596 F.2d at 368. 
33. King, 688 F.2d at 493. 
34. Church 0/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 157. 
35. "TeMP is a continuing series of statistical studies by the IRS on a national scale 
to measure the level of compliance with federal tax law." Long, 596 F.2d at 364. 
36. Id. 
37. Although the IRS disclosed the tabulation material requested, the plaintiffs ar­
gued "that the district court should have granted a permanent injunction against further 
withholding of this information." Id. at 364 n.!. The court of appeals requested that on 
remand the district court look at all the circumstances of the case and determine if an 
injunction was appropriate. Id. at 369. 
38. Id. at 364. The district court held that even if the removal of identifying infor­
mation would take the material outside the scope of § 6103, the IRS had no duty to remove 
that information to bring it within the FOIA. Id. at 365. The court further held that the 
"deletion of identifying information would be so expensive that the IRS was relieved of its 
duty imposed by the FOIA to segregate revealable information." Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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court interpreted the Haskell amendment as allowing for the disclo­
sure of any non-identifying information and held that "return infor­
mation" includes only information that can identify a particular 
taxpayer.41 The court's analysis was limited to refuting the IRS' 
arguments. 
The plaintiffs pointed to the fact that they requested data with 
identifying information deleted and they argued that so edited data is 
not "return information" as defined by § 6103.42 They reasoned, 
therefore, that because the requested data was not protected from dis­
closure by § 6103 it should have been released pursuant to the 
FOIA.43 
The IRS argued that in addition to being non-identifying, source 
data must be in a statistical study in order to be exempt from the non­
disclosure provision of § 6103.44 In support of this position the IRS 
argued that the purpose of the Haskell amendment was to insure con­
tinued release of statistical studies by the IRS.45 It also argued that 
"return information" includes non-identifying as well as identifying 
information.46 Presumably, the IRS believed that source data which 
did not identify could still be included in the definition of "return 
information. " 
The IRS relied upon the text of § 6103 and the legislative history 
of the Haskell amendment to support its proposition that the amend­
ment allows only for the disclosure of non-identifying statistical stud­
ies,41 The IRS argued that "a requirement to disclose the edited data 
would be a significant extension of the duty to disclose under the law 
prior to the Haskell amendment and that it was not the intent of the 
41. Id. at 368. 
42. Id. at 365. 
43. Id. 
44. The IRS also argued that even if the names, addresses, and social security num­
bers of taxpayers were deleted from the requested material there would still be a risk of 
indirect identification. For example, a requester may hold certain extrinsic information 
which, when combined with the disclosed data, would identify a particular taxpayer. Id. at 
367. This argument is referred to as the "informed requester" argument. See infra text 
accompanying note 140 and notes 182-87. 
45. Long, 596 F.2d at 367-68. In support of this position the IRS pointed to the 
remarks made by Senator Haskell in proposing the amendment: "the addition by the IRS of 
easily deletable identifying information to the type of statistical study or compilation of 
data ... will not prevent disclosure of such study or compilation under the newly amended 
section of § 6103." Id. (quoting 122 CONGo REC. S12,606 (1976». 
46. Id. at 368. 
47. This note refers to this proposition relied on by the IRS as the "statistical stud­
ies" interpretation. 
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amendment to effect such changes. "48 
The court rejected this argument on the ground that the remarks 
do not indicate that the amendment was "simply a codification of pre­
existing IRS practice. "49 The court determined that the purpose of 
§ 6103 is two-fold: first, to protect the privacy of individual taxpayers; 
and second, to permit the disclosure of compilations of useful data in 
circumstances which do not pose a serious risk of privacy breach. 50 
To support further its proposition that only statistical studies are 
disclosable under the Haskell amendment, the IRS discussed the lan­
guage of § 6103. The IRS argued that the text of § 6103 indicated that 
there are two types of "return information," that which identifies a 
particular taxpayer and that which does not. 51 The IRS concluded 
that the mandate of § 6103 not to disclose "return information" may 
extend to "return information" which identifies individual taxpayers 
as well as to that which does not. The IRS pointed to § 6103(f) to 
support this argument. 52 Section 6103(f) allows the Secretary of 
Treasury to furnish "return information" to certain legislative com­
mittees.53 However, when the "return information" can be associated 
with or identify a particular taxpayer, it shall be released to such com­
mittee only when that committee is sitting in closed executive ses­
48. Long, 596 F.2d at 367. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for description 
of the law prior to 1976. 
49. Long, 596 F.2d at 368. The court noted that: 
Even if we were to accept the IRS' argument that the Haskell amendment was 
simply intended to freeze the status quo, neither our research nor that of the 
parties reveals any case deciding whether, under law existing prior to the Haskell 
amendment, audit results which were not identified to particular taxpayers were 
not open to FOIA disclosure. 
Id. at 368 n.4. 
50. Id. at 368. For example, the plaintiff in Nuefeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) sought information relating to the practices by government officials of intervening in 
IRS proceedings. Professor Nuefeld "disclaim[ed] any interest in information that would 
directly or indirectly identify individual taxpayers." Id. at 662. See also infra note 130. 
5I. Long, 596 F.2d at 368. 
52. 26 U.S.c. § 6103(f) (1982). 

53. Section 6103(f)(2) states: 

Upon written request by the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 

the Secretary shall furnish him with any return or return information specified in 

such request. Such Chief of Staff may submit such return or return information to 

any committee described in paragraph (1), except that any return or return infor­

mation which can be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, 

a particular taxpayer shall be furnished to such committee only when sitting in 

closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to 

such disclosure. 

Id. 
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sion. 54 The IRS argued that § 6103(f) imports the negative 
implication that when "return infonnation" does not identify a partic­
ular taxpayer, the committees do not have to sit in closed session.55 
Therefore, the IRS concluded, "return infonnation" includes identify­
ing as well as non-identifying infonnation. Presumably, the IRS con­
tended that this "6103(f)" argument contradicted the plaintiffs' 
interpretation that "return infonnation" consists only of identifying 
information. Apparently, the IRS reasoned that because "return in­
formation" does include data that is non-identifying (§ 6103 (f», the 
Haskell amendment requires something more than the mere fact of 
non-identification before "return infonnation" can be disclosed. 
The court rejected the IRS' argument. The court saw its decision 
as a choice between accepting either the explicit language of the Has­
kell amendment or the implication drawn from another subsection, 
§ 6103(f).56 The court found that the IRS, in relying on § 6103(f) for 
an interpretation of the Haskell amendment, ignored the language of 
§ 6103(b)(2) which defines "return information." In refusing to be 
bound by that interpretation the court concluded that information 
which does not identify is disclosable.57 
The IRS in Long also argued that § 610858 demonstrated that the 
Haskell amendment referred only to the disclosure of statistical infor­
mation. The IRS noted that the purpose of § 6108 is to prevent the 
disclosure of identifying statistical studies and the language used to 
achieve that purpose is identical to the language of the Haskell amend­
ment. 59 The IRS, therefore, argued that § 6108( c) and the Haskell 
amendment both are directed at statistical studies and because source 
data is not in a statistical study, such data is not protected from the 
non-disclosure requirement of § 6103.60 
The court found it unnecessary to interpret the reach of § 610861 
54. 	 Id. 
55. 	 Long, 596 F.2d at 368. 
56. 	 Id. at 368. 
57. 	 Id. 
58. 	 26 U.S.C. § 6108 (1982). 
59. 	 Long, 596 F.2d at 368-69; 26 U.S.C. § 6108 "Statistical publications and stud­
ies." 	 Section 6108(c) of the Act states: 
No publication or other disclosure of statistics or other information required or 
authorized by subsection (a) or special statistical study authorized by subsection 
(b) shall in any manner permit the statistics, study, or any information so pub­
lished, furnished, or otherwise disclosed to be associated with. or otherwise iden
tify. directly or indirectly. a particular taxpayer. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
60. 	 Long, 596 F.2d at 369. 
61. 	 Id. 
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because of Senator Haskell's remark that the amendment would per­
mit disclosure of the tax model. 62 The court concluded that because 
the tax model, which is not a statistical study, is subject to disclosure, 
the TCMP is as well. 
The court concluded that non-identifying information is dis­
closable under the Haskell amendment and that TCMP source mate­
rial is not exempt from disclosure simply because it is not in statistical 
form. The court held that TCMP source material may be disclosable 
under the terms of the Haskell amendment if the release of that mate­
rial would not indirectly identify a particular taxpayer.63 The court of 
appeals remanded the case to the district court for a determination on 
that point.64 
The court's conclusion is reasonable because it comports with the 
legislative history as well as the text of the Haskell amendment. 65 
Given the premise on which the FOIA was based,66 it is likely that 
Congress would want to encourage the disclosure of non-identifying 
information. The "identity test" of Long, which permits disclosure of 
non-identifying information, balances Congress' intent to disclose in­
formation with the interest in protecting the taxpayer's right of pri­
vacy. Because the court's interpretation does not allow for the release 
of identifying information, a breach of the taxpayer's privacy is not 
implicated.67 By limiting its analysis to the refutation of IRS argu­
ments, however, the court failed to present a number of arguments 
that would support further its conclusion. 68 
B. King v. IRS and the "Statistical Studies" Approach 
In 1978, Sharon King requested that the IRS release "data, mem­
oranda and background information relating to or commenting on cer­
62. The TeMP and the Tax Model are similar. The court discussed this similarity 
earlier in the opinion when it suggested that, "[i]n evaluating the degree of the risk of 
disclosure from TeMP source material, it will be helpful to . .. compare the risk that the 
IRS has found acceptable with the tax model." Id. at 367. The court again referred to the 
tax model in the opinion when it rejected the district court's finding that only statistical 
tabulations were important in determining the effectiveness of the IRS. The court of ap­
peals noted that with respect to the tax model "the IRS will either supply statistical tabula­
tions from the data base or it will supply the source data itself, apparently recognizing the 
value of a researcher's doing his own analyses. The TeMP is similar." Id. at 369. 
63. Id. at 370. This issue of the "informed requester" is explored more fully later in 
the text. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41 and notes 182-86. 
64. Long, 596 F.2d at 370. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60. 
66. See supra note 2. 
67. But see infra note 140 and accompanying text ("informed requester" argument). 
68. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14 and notes 166-87, 199-201. 
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tain revenue rulings and regulations which had been issued by the 
Service on various subjects ...."69 Pursuant to the FOIA the IRS 
released some, but not all, of the documents.7o The plaintiff filed suit 
against the IRS in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, seeking the release of the remain­
ing, non-disclosed documents. The district court granted summary 
judgment, ordering the IRS to disclose eight of the documents under 
the FOIA.71 The IRS appealed from that portion of the order which 
related to the eight documents the court exempted from disclosure 
under § 6103,72 
The issue presented before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
was whether the district court erred in holding that the documents 
must be released after deletions of taxpayer identifying material were 
made. The plaintiff, in adopting the "identity test" interpretation de­
veloped in Long,73 argued that information that does not identify a 
particular taxpayer is not "return information" as defined by 
§ 6103(b)(2).74 The plaintiff further argued that only "return informa­
tion" is protected from disclosure under § 6103.75 The plaintiff based 
her conclusion on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in 
Long v. IRS as well as the legislative history of the Haskell 
amendment.76 
The IRS urged the court to adopt the "statistical studies" inter­
pretation of the Haskell amendment. 77 The IRS relied on the lan­
69. 	 King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488, 489 (7th Cir. 1982). 
70. 	 Id. 
71. 	 The eight documents at issue were: 
(a) . two taxpayer protests of IRS agents' audit report; 
(b) 	 a transmittal letter and a portion of an audit; 
(c) 	 a form setting forth adjustments to a taxpayer's return and the reasons 
therefor; 
(d) 	 a form stating a specific taxpayer's liability by period, the amount of 

adjustments and the reasons therefor; 

(e) 	 two IRS intra-office memoranda requesting information on a specific 

taxpayer; 

(f) 	 a letter from the IRS to a taxpayer asking the taxpayer to alter its 
method of accounting. 
Id. at 490. 
72. The court ordered the release of twenty-four documents not claimed exempt 
from disclosure under § 6103. The IRS did not appeal that portion of the order. Id. 
73. 	 Long, 596 F.2d 362. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
74. 	 King, 688 F.2d at 493. 
75. 	 Id. 
76. 	 Id. 
77. The IRS argued that for "return information" to be exempt from the § 6103 non­
disclosure requirement, the information must be amalgamated with other data to form sta­
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guage of § 6103(b )(2), the legislative history of the Haskell 
amendment, and the broad statutory context of § 6103 to support its 
position.78 The IRS argued that even if the district court order were 
followed and all identifying information were deleted, the remaining 
data was not in a statistical study and therefore it would not meet the 
standards for disclosure set forth in the Haskell amendment.79 Appar­
ently, the IRS concluded that because those documents were not ex­
empt from the non-disclosure requirement of § 6103, the IRS was not 
permitted to disclose them.80 
The court of appeals agreed with the IRS' interpretation of the 
Haskell amendment,81 holding that the amendment provides only for 
disclosure of statistical studies and compilations which do not identify 
particular taxpayers.82 The court relied on the language of § 6103 as 
well as the legislative history of the Haskell amendment in deciding 
that the release of the documents was improper and reversing the 
judgment of the district court. 83 
The court began the analysis of § 6103(b)(2) by examining the 
language of the Haskell amendment, focusing on the words "in a 
form."84 The court rejected the plaintiff's proposed "identity test" by 
noting that the test would render superfluous those three words. That 
is, if one were to accept the plaintiff's definition of "return informa­
tion" the meaning of the Haskell amendment would not be changed if 
"in a form" were to be deleted. The court refused to construe the 
statute in such a way.85 
The court's concern about statutory superfluity was inconsistent 
with the narrow interpretation it assigned the Haskell amendment. 
The court was correct that the "identity test" would render the words 
tistical studies or compilations and must not directly or indirectly identify a specific tax­
payer. Id. at 491. Presumably the IRS noted that the eight documents in question were 
not in an amalgamated form and that their release could possibly result in indirect identifi­
cation of individual taxpayers. Id. 
78. Id. at 488. 
79. Id. at 491. 
80. Although this argument was not articulated in the court's opinion the conclusion 
is a logical result of the IRS' argument. 
81. King, 688 F.2d at 491-92. 
82. Id. at 493. 
83. Id. at 496. 
84. Id. at 491. "[B]ut such term [return information] does not include data in a/orm 
which can be associated with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly a particular tax­
payer." 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B) (1982) (emphasis added). It is the three words "in a 
form" that underlie the court's position that the information must be changed in structure 
before it is disclosed under the Haskell amendment. King, 688 F.2d 488. 
85. Id. at 491. 
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"in a form" superfluous; however, its own interpretation rendered an 
entire section superfluous. In adopting the "statistical studies" inter­
pretation, the King court ignored explicit language of § 6108 which 
already provides for the disclosure of statistical studies and compila­
tions to certain parties.86 It is unlikely Congress would want to reiter­
ate implicitly in the Haskell amendment that which it stated explicitly 
in § 6108. Therefore, the Haskell amendment must have provided for 
something more than just the release of statistical studies. 
The court determined that if the "identity test" were to be ac­
cepted, all the items specifically listed in § 6103(b )(2)(A) would also 
become superfluous.87 Apparently the court reasoned that there 
would not be any purpose in listing individual items as "return infor­
mation" if they are only "return information" when they identify. 
That argument is premised on the possibility that the only purpose of 
§ 6103(b)(2)(A) is to list specific items that constitute "return informa­
tion." However, because there is another purpose for § 6103(b)(2)(A), 
the "identity test" would not render that section superfluous. 88 Those 
items not listed in § 6103(b)(2)(A) are treated as any other item re­
quested under the FOIA. 89 
The King court determined that had Congress wanted to exempt 
from disclosure only those items that identified individual taxpayers, it 
could have done so with a much simpler statute.90 For example the 
statute could have specified that "all non-identifying information is 
disclosable."91 This language, the court argued, is much clearer than 
86. 26 u.s.c. § 6108 (1982). See supra note 59. Subsection 6108(a) mandates that 
the Secretary "prepare and publish not less than annually statistics reasonably available 
with respect to the operation of the internal revenue laws ...." Subsection (b) allows the 
Secretary, "upon written request, to make special statistical studies and compilations in­
volving return information available ... and furnish to such party or parties transcripts of 
any such special statistical study or compilation." Subsection (c) mandates that any statisti­
cal study or compilation released must be in amalgamated form so as to render the infor­
mation anonymous. Id. 
87. King, 688 F.2d at 491. 
88. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153,176, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 
947 (1987) (Wald, J., dissenting). See infra note 179. 
89. The standards of review for the IRS' determinations as to whether information is 
disclosable differ depending on which statute mandates the non-disclosure. If an item is 
listed under § 6103, and made non-disclosable, upon judicial review the claimant has the 
burden of proving that the IRS abused its discretion by refusing to disclose information. 
However, if the FOIA applies, the court determines the matter de novo and the agency has 
the burden of showing that the non-disclosure was warranted by one of the stated excep­
tions. See White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897, 900 (6th Cir. 1983); Zale Corp. v. IRS, 481 F. Supp. 
486, 490 (D.D.C. 1979); accord King, 688 F.2d at 495. 
90. King, 688 F.2d at 491 (citing Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980)). 
91. Id. at 491. 
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the technique of listing specific items in one subsection and then stat­
ing in another subsection that those items count only if they do not 
identify. The court concluded that Congress did not intend the items 
in § 6103(b)(2)(A) to be disclosed and that the result of the "identity 
test" is not germane with respect to this intent.92 
The court continued its analysis of the Haskell amendment by 
looking at the remaining language: "which cannot be associated with, 
or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."93 
The court asserted that the "identity test" would also render this lan­
guage superfluous because the plaintiffs' interpretation equated "asso­
ciated with" and "directly or indirectly identify."94 The court noted 
that "information which might not on its face identify a taxpayer 
might well be associated with a taxpayer by a FOIA requester who 
knows sufficient extrinsic facts ... to draft a request in a manner suffi­
ciently narrow to produce information which could only pertain to 
that taxpayer."95 The court relied on a basic rule of statutory con­
struction which prohibits courts "in the guise of construction of an 
act, [from] either add[ing] words to or eliminating words from the lan­
guage used by [C]ongress."96 In conforming with this rule, the court 
rejected the plaintiffs' proposed definition.97 
The court found that unless disclosed information was in an 
amalgamated form the court could never be certain that the requested 
information would not "indirectly identify an individual taxpayer. "98 
This "informed requester" argument is premised on the notion that if 
a requester already holds some extrinsic knowledge about an individ­
ual's tax return, that requester would not need identifying information 
to determine to whom the "non-identifying" information relates.99 
The court concluded that if requested information were to be amalga­
mated with other information the risk of indirect identification would 
be less.J<lO 
In further support of its conclusion that "return information" is 
not limited merely to taxpayer identifying information, the court ana­
92. Id. at 494. 
93. Id. at 491. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (quoting DeSoto Sec. Co. v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 
1956». 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. This is discussed more fully infra in the text accompanying notes 136-41. 
100. King, 688 F.2d at 492. 
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lyzed the broad statutory context of § 6103.101 The court articulated 
the § 6103(f) argument proposed by the IRS in Long 102 and found 
this language to contradict the identity test proposed by the plain­
tiff.103 The court disagreed with the determination in Long and con­
cluded that this language clearly acknowledges two types of "return 
information": "return information" which identifies individual tax­
payers and "return information" which does not. I04 
The court also relied on the legislative history of the Haskell 
amendment and the 1981 amendment to § 6103(b)(2)(B). Even 
though the King court agreed with the plaintiff that Senator Haskell's 
remarks were not a comprehensive statement on the amendment's 
purpose, lOS the court concluded that those remarks did not support 
the plaintiff's "identity test."106 Rather, but without offering explicit 
reasons for its conclusion, the court found Senator Haskell's remarks 
to be "highly consistent" with permitting the disclosure of "return in­
formation" only if it is in a non-identifying statistical study.107 The 
court could have been relying on the five separate times that the Sena­
tor mentioned statistical studies and compilations. lOS However, these 
statements provide support only for the fact that § 6103 does not pre­
101. Id. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. 
103. The court determined that if the plaintiffs' interpretation were correct and "re­
turn information" included only identifiable information, every time a committee requested 
"return information" it would have to sit in closed executive session. King, 688 F.2d at 
492. The court also determined that this interpretation would render portions of (f)(I) and 
(f)(2) superfluous. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. The plaintiff argued that the remarks were made in the context of questioning 
whether the IRS "could evade its previously existing obligation to disclose statistical stud­
ies simply by adding identifying information." Id. at 493. For full remarks see supra text 
accompanying note 26. 
106. King, 688 F.2d at 493. 
107. Id. 
108. Senator Haskell commented: 

The purpose of this amendment is to insure that statistical studies [and compila­

tions] now prepared by the IRS and disclosed by it to outside parties will continue 

[to be disclosed] .... The IRS can continue to release for research purposes 
statistical studies and compilations of data, such as the tax model, which do not 
identify individual taxpayers .... The definition of 'return information' was in­
tended to neither enhance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom 
of Information Act to statistical studies and compilations of data by the Internal 
Revenue Service. . .. [T]he addition by the Internal Revenue Service of easily 
deletable identifying information to the type of statistical studies and compilation 
of data ... will not prevent disclosure of such study or compilation. . .. In such 
instances, the identifying information would be deleted and disclosure of [sic] sta­
tistical study or compilation be made. 
122 CoNG. REC. S24,012 (1976) (statement by Sen. Haskell). 
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clude statistical studies and compilations of data from being disclosed 
simply because they contain items listed in § 6103(b)(2)(A). These 
statements do not support the court's contention that § 6103 was di­
rected exclusively at statistical studies. To the contrary, Senator Has­
kell referred to the tax model which is not a statistical study or 
compilation of data. The Senator's remarks signify Congress' intent to 
insure that prior IRS disclosure practices under the FOIA would not 
change. 109 
In further support of its own interpretation of the Haskell amend­
ment as well as its decision to reject the Long "identity test," the 
court analyzed the 1981 amendment to § 6103(b )(2)(B).IlO The court 
noted that the "purpose and effect of [this] amendment is to bar the 
release of the information sought by the plaintiffs in Long."lll The 
court looked to the language of the committee report l12 and deter­
mined, by negative implication, that the Haskell amendment protected 
from disclosure non-statistical data and "return information."1l3 The 
109. Appellant's brief at 13, Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 156 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane). 
110. King, 688 F.2d at 494. The amendment added to the end of § 6103 the 
language: 
Nothing in the preceding sentence, or in any other provision of law, shall be con­
strued to require the disclosure of standards used or to be used for the selection of 
returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such stan­
dards, if the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seriously impair as­
sessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue laws. 
26 U.S.C. 	§ 6103 (1982). 
Ill. The plaintiff in King argued that the reasoning of the Long decision was not 
affected by the 1981 amendment. King, 688 F.2d at 492 n.2. 
112. The committee report stated in relevant part: 

Present law restricts the disclosure of tax returns and return information. How­

ever, information that cannot identify any particular taxpayer is not protected 

under the disclosure restrictions. Because of this, questions have been raised con­

cerning whether the IRS can legally refuse to disclose information which is used 

to develop standards for aUditing tax returns. 

The House bill provides that nothing in the tax law, or in any other Federal 
law, will be construed to require the disclosure of standards used, or to be used, 
for the selection of returns for examination (or data used, or to be used, for deter­
mining such standards), if the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seri­
ously impair assessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue 
laws. However, it is intended that nothing in this provision be construed to limit 
disclosure of statistical data or other information (other than of the type that 
could be used by the IRS to determine criteria for selecting returns for examina­
tion) to the extent permitted under the present law. Thus, any information that is 
currently made available will continue to be available. 
S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 264, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 74, 353. 
113. King, 688 F.2d at 494. The court reasoned: "By reiterating that statistical data 
and other non-return information will remain available to the extent of prior law, the Com­
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court relied on the committee report to draw a negative implication 
while it ignored the explicit language of that same report. The second 
sentence of the committee report clearly supports the "identity test" 
interpretation: "However, information that cannot identify a particu­
lar taxpayer is not protected under the disclosure restrictions."114 
Although the 1981 amendment disallowed the release of audit reports 
which were the subject of Long, it explicitly accepted Long's interpre­
tation of the Haskell amendment. The committee report, having 
stated in the second sentence that non-identifying information is dis­
closable, provides that "any information that is currently made avail­
able will continue to be available."115 The importance of the Long 
decision was not its result, but that the court interpreted the Haskell 
amendment in a way that was consistent with the purpose for which it 
was proposed, that is, the release of non-identifying information. 
The court in King, however, specifically refuted the analysis of 
the court in Long. The King court felt that the Ninth Circuit Court 
Court of Appeals erred by importing the policies of the FOIA into the 
interpretation of § 6103. The court commented that the policies be­
hind 26 U.S.C. § 6103 and 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA) were precisely op­
posite.116 That is not the case. The purpose of the FOIA is to allow 
for the release of information possessed by the federal government 
while protecting the identity of individuals to whom that information 
pertains. Section 6103 allows the release of information possessed by 
the IRS when that information does not identify the individual to 
whom it pertains. The policy behind both provisions is to minimize 
the abuse by the government of the information it controls. These two 
statutes are not "precisely opposite" as the King court contended; on 
the contrary, they are quite similar. 
The court in King determined that even if the FOIA analysis were 
proper, the Long court misapplied the balancing test. 117 The King 
court noted that the FOIA's balancing test overlooks the deleterious 
impact upon the voluntary system of tax payment which may result if 
taxpayers know their "return information" is subject to disclosure. I IS 
In reaching its conclusion the court failed to consider two factors that 
mittee Report creates the negative implication that non-statistical data and return informa­
tion were protected under prior law, and remain so under the 1981 amendment." Id. 
114. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 264, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 74, 353 (emphasis added). 
115. Id. 
116. King, 688 F.2d at 493. 
117. In a tax context, the FOIA would seek to balance the public's interest in disclo­
sure against the taxpayer's need for protection. Id. at 493. 
118. Id. at 494. 
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would mitigate the risk of a negative effect. First, the information 
sought to be released under the Haskell amendment would not identify 
anyone. Second, even if there is a risk of an "informed requester,"119 
there are civil and criminal penalties imposed on taxpayers for failing 
to file tax returns. These penalties and the non-identifying nature of 
the information combine to minimize the risk of a negative effect on 
the tax assessment system. 120 
C. 	 Church of Scientology of California v. IRS and the 
"Reformulation" Approach 
On May 16, 1980, the Church of Scientology of California re­
quested information from the IRS "relating to or containing the 
names of Scientology, Church of Scientology, any specific Scientology 
church or entity identified by containing the names, L. Ron Hubbard 
or Mary Sue Hubbard."121 It also requested "all documents gener­
ated, reviewed or which otherwise came into the possession of the IRS 
subsequent to the preparation of an index in a tax case involving the 
Church of Scientology of California pending in the United States Tax 
Court."122 The plaintiff's request required the IRS to search files in a 
number of IRS offices. 
In January, 1981, the IRS informed the Church that the informa­
tion sought constituted "return information" of third parties and 
therefore was not disclosable. 123 The Church then filed a complaint in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking the release of 
certain documents the IRS claimed were exempt from disclosure. 124 
The court granted the IRS' motion for summary judgment and dis­
missed the case with prejudice. 125 In a panel opinion for the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge Scalia126 ordered 
the district court decision vacated and remanded the case for further 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97; see also infra text accompanying 
notes 136-41. 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 208-10 for discussion of disclosures' effect on 
tax assessment system. 
121. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146,147 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3512 (1987). 
122. This request refers to Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 
381 (1983). 
123. 	 Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 148. 
124. 	 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (D.D.C. 1983). 
125. 	 Id. 
126. Justice Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States in Sep­
tember, 1986. This note refers to him as Judge Scalia, the position he held at the time of 
the decision in Church of Scientology. 
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proceedings. 127 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co­
lumbia, sitting en bane,128 simultaneously issued another opinion in 
the same case. 129 The court addressed the issue of the interpretation 
of the Haskell amendment,130 determining that deleting names and 
other identifying information from requested IRS documents did not 
127. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d 146. The court in the panel opinion addressed 
three main issues: first, whether the FOIA governed the disclosure of the requested infor­
mation; second, whether the IRS properly refused to check its regional and district offices 
for the requested information (although it was not required to, the IRS did search its na­
tional office as well as its Los Angeles office); third, whether the IRS erred in limiting its 
search to files which refer only to the California church. [d. at 148-52. The court deter­
mined: first, the rules for disclosure promulgated under the FOIA are not superseded by 
§ 6103; second, because the Church did not request the information in accordance with 
published rules, the IRS was not required to search all district and regional offices; third, 
the IRS was "not required to search through every file in its possession to see if a reference 
to Scientology appeared somewhere in it"; and finally, that the IRS must show that all the 
requested information came within the statutory definition of "return information" before 
it could rightfully refuse to disclose the information. [d. The court held that: 
In light of the language of the foregoing discussion the IRS must either conduct a 
new search for information responsive to the Church's request that refers to third 
parties or establish through affidavits that all information about third parties in 
identifiable files requested by the Church is generically protected by section 6103. 
[d. at 152. 
128. Judge Wald's dissenting opinion in the en bane decision expressed concern that 
"the court's recent practice of issuing en bane opinions on legal issues, as opposed to con­
crete factual scenarios, see also United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en 
bane), poses problems." Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d 153, 172 n.1 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
Judge Wald cautioned the court to view the controversy before it, not as a single legal issue 
but as a full fledged fact-based adversarial proceeding. [d. Judge Scalia noted that isolating 
legal issues from the remainder of the case "reflects the fact that appellate review serves a 
dual purpose: the correction of legal error and the establishment of legal rules for future 
guidance." [d. at 155 n.!. He continued that at the second appellate level the law clarify­
ing function predominates and that it would be perverse to abandon the efficient practice of 
en bane disposition just as the courts' caseload has increased. [d. at ISS-56. Judge Scalia 
concluded that restricting en banc considerations would make the judicial function of an 
appellate court inordinately difficult. [d. 
129. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane). 
130. The court established that the "newly emerged circuit conflict has induced us to 
reconsider the position stated in our 1981 panel decision" in Nuefeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 	 Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 157. 
In Nuefeld the plaintiff sought access to certain memoranda, logs, forms, and corre­
spondence relating to contacts between high ranking federal officials and the IRS regarding 
tax matters of third parties. The Nuefeld court held, in accordance with Long, "that 're­
turn information' properly defined, excludes only information that directly or indirectly 
identifies a particular taxpayer." Nuefeld, 646 F.2d at 665. However, the court did not 
hold that "mere deletion of names and addresses removes all 'return information' from [the 
requested data)." [d. The court remanded to the district court to determine "what infor­
mation, other than the name and address, poses a risk of identifying a taxpayer and how 
great that risk is." [d. at 661. See Common Cause v. IRS, 646 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
issued the same day as Nuefeld and relating to the same documents. 
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render those documents disclosable under § 6103.\31 Rather, non­
identifying information must have been reformulated to have been 
rendered disclosable. 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals examined 
§ 6103(b)(2) subparagraphs (A) and (B) and began its analysis by re­
futing the Long court's conclusion that "return information" includes 
only data that can identify a particular taxpayer. The Church of 
Scientology court noted that it was peculiar to list items in 
§ 6103(b)(2)(A) and qualify that list with the Haskell amendment. 132 
The court determined that if Long was correct, the Haskell amend­
ment changed the scope of protection under § 6103 from all "return 
information" listed in § 6103(b)(2)(A) to only that "return informa­
tion" which identifies a taxpayer. 133 The Church ofScientology court 
did not believe that the Haskell amendment limited the definition of 
"return information" in that way. Like the court in King, the Church 
ofScientology court opined that had Congress intended to limit "re­
turn information" to information which identifies, it could have done 
so in a more natural way.134 The court concluded that the Long inter­
pretation also produced a "similarly mindless consequence in subpara­
graph (B) which lists certain exclusions from ... FOIA."135 The 
court claimed that it was absurd to incorporate these exclusions so 
precisely into the body of the definition of "return information" just to 
write them all back out again in the Haskell amendmentp6 
The Haskell amendment, the court found, suggests that some­
131. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d 153. 
132. The court noted that: 

[[I]t was peculiar to catalogue in such detail] the specific items that constitute 

"return information" (e.g. "income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, 

credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over 

assessments, or tax payments ... or other data, received by, prepared by, fur­

nished, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return") while leaving as an 

afterthought the major qualification that none of these items counts unless it iden­

tifies a taxpayer. 
Id. at 157. See supra text accompanying note 13 for the language of § 6103(b)(2). 
133. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 159. 
134. Judge Scalia stated: Such intent would more naturally have been expressed not 
in an exclusion ("but such term does not include ....") but in the body of the definition­
by stating, for example, that "the term 'return information' means the following informa­
tion that can be associated with or identify a particular taxpayer ...." Id. at 157. Cf 
supra text accompanying notes 90-91. 
135. That section states that "return information" includes: "any part of any written 
determination or any background file document relating to such written determination (as 
such terms are defined in 611O(b» which is not open to the public inspection under 6110." 
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(B) (1982). 
136. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 157. 
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thing more than the mere fact of non-identifiability is needed before 
"return information" can be disclosed. In focusing on the language of 
the Haskell amendment, the court concluded that the phrase "in a 
form" requires that "return information" be reformulated before that 
information can be disclosed. 137 
The court reasoned that the legislative intent of the Haskell 
amendment further supported the rejection of the Long interpreta­
tion. 138 The court conceded that although there was no reason why 
Congress would object to the release of non-identifying information, 
the assessment that information is not identifying would not eliminate 
the risk of a privacy breach. 139 The court explained that non-identify­
ing information, when combined with certain extrinsic information 
held by the requester, could identify a taxpayer.l40 The court con­
cluded, in light of the "informed requester" problem, that the "iden­
tity test" proposed in Long was inconsistent with the Haskell 
amendment. 141 
The majority determined that Congress intended "heightened 
protection" with regard to tax information and that the FOIA's non­
identification standard as accepted by Long does not afford this protec­
tion.142 The court acknowledged Congress' determination that the oc­
casional unknowing release of information entitled to be withheld 
under the FOIA is outweighed by the benefits of openness. 143 The 
court noted, however, that this is not the case in all situationsl44 and 
that the FOIA's non-identification protection has not been considered 
137. Id. at 154. The court further determined that the phrase "in a form" would be 
superfluous if the Long interpretation were correct. In other words, the phrase could be 
deleted without changing the meaning of the statute. Hence the amendment would say 
return information "does not include data ... which cannot be associated with or otherwise 
identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." Id. at 157. This determination is 
similar to the one made by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in King. See supra text 
accompanying notes 84-85. 
138. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 160. 
139. Id. at 158. 
140. For example, the court described a FOIA request "for the amounts and benefi­
ciaries of all charitable deductions claimed by taxpayers within a particular postal ZIP code 
area during a particular tax year." Id. The court noted that "that information would 
normally not identify the charitable gift [or beneficiary] of any particular taxpayer but it 
would do so if the requester had been told by his neighbor that the latter made a charitable 
gift last year of 2,775 [dollars]." Id. 
141. Id. at 158-59. 
142. Before information is disclosed under the FOIA, identifying information must 
be deleted so as to render the document non-identifying. See 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1982). 
143. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 158. 
144. See, e.g., 50 U.S.c. § 431 (Supp. II 1984) (exempting CIA operational files from 
the FOIA). 
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adequate for the other "major category of personal information," cen­
sus data. 145 Similarly, according to the court, § 6103's restriction 
upon the use of tax information within the government itself evidenced 
Congress' increased protection for tax return information. 146 The 
court concluded that it would "be absurd to provide such guarantees 
against disclosure of identifying information while relying upon no 
more than FOIA's protection [through Long's interpretation of the 
Haskell amendment] when a request for less publicly important infor­
mation is received."147 
The court continued its analysis by determining what particular 
non-identifying data the Haskell amendment excludes from the defini­
tion of "return information." The court discussed the phrase "in a 
form" and found it significant that the phrase does not appear in any 
145. Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 158 (citing Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 
345 (1982». 
146. The court also discussed 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(I) (1982) which imposes a crimi­
nal penalty on government employees for unlawful disclosure of tax information. Church 
of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 159. For the restrictions placed on the government itself by 
§ 6103, see supra note 12 discussing 26 U.S.C §§ 6103(d)-(i),(k),(l). 
In detailing other restrictions upon the use of tax information the court examined 
§ 6110. Section 6110 describes the procedures for public inspection ofIRS written determi­
nations and background files. The FOIA is normally particularly focused on the disclosure 
of written determinations in order to prevent government agencies from developing "secret 
law." However, in the case of tax information, 26 U.S.C. § 6110 (1982) provides greater 
protection against improper disclosure than that which is provided by the FOIA. 
The FOIA requires that written determinations be made available in the agency's 
reading room. 5 U.S.c. § 552(a)(2) (1982). In contrast, § 6110 details procedures for dis­
closure of written determinations as well as remedies available to the individual to whom 
they pertain: 
§ 611O(f)(I): "Notice of intention to disclose .... The Secretary shall mail a notice of 
intention to disclose such determinations or document to any person to whom they pertain 
...." Id. 
§ 611O(f)(3)(A): 
Any person (1) to whom a written determination pertains (or ...) (ii) who 
disagrees with any failure to make a deletion with respect to that portion of any 
written determination or any background file document which is to be open to or 
available to public inspection, and (iii) who has exhausted administrative reme­
dies ... may ... file a petition in the United States Tax Court ... for a determina­
tion with respect to that portion of such written determination or background file 
document which is to be open to public inspection. 
Id. 
§ 611O(f)(4)(B) provides that: "[a]ny person to whom such determination or back­
ground file document pertains may intervene in a proceeding ... " filed in the United States 
Tax Court or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for an order 
requiring that a written determination or background file document be made available to 
public inspection. Id. 
147. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 159. 
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§ 6103 provisions which describe all identifying data. 148 Nor is "in a 
form" found in the provision which deals with not "return informa­
tion" but material that has already been reformulated. 149 The court 
noted, however, that the phrase is found in provisions requiring refor­
mulation of "return information."150 The court reasoned that because 
the phrase "in a form" is used in other sections of § 6103 that relate to 
148. Section 6103(f)(1) (1982), §§ 6103(f)(4)(A) and (B) (1982) provide for the re­
lease of any "return information" to certain government entities. 

Section 6103(f)(l) states: "[T]he Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or 

return information ... except that any return or return information which can be associ­

ated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer shall be fur­

nished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session." Id. (emphasis 

added). 

Section 6103(f)(4)(A) states, in part: "The Joint Committee on Taxation may also submit 

such return or return information ... except that any return or return information which 

can be associated with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer 

shall be furnished to such committee only when sitting in closed executive session ...." Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Section 6103(f)(4)(B) states: "Any return or return information . .. may be submitted by 
the Committee. .. except that any return or return information which can be associated 
with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer, shall be furnished 
... only when sitting in closed executive session ...." Id. (emphasis added). 
149. In order for the IRS to create statistics the statistical information must have 
been reformulated. Section 6108(c) states: "No publication or other disclosure of statistics 
... shall in any [way] permit the statistics, study, or any information so published, fur­
nished, or otherwise disclosed to be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indi­
rectly, a particular taxpayer." 26 U.S.C. 6108(c) (1982). 
150. Section 6103(i)(7)(A) (1982) provides for the limited disclosure of return infor­
mation to the General Accounting Office for the purpose of conducting audits. The court 
noted that here the phrase "in a form" is associated with reformulation. Church of 
Scientology, 792 F.2d at 160-61. The court interpreted this section as assuring that if the 
General Accounting Office discloses "return information" it does so in a way "carefully 
devised to avoid the disclosure ofidentifying data"; that is, information that is reformulated. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Section 6103(i)(7)(A) states: "Returns available for inspection- Except no such officer 
or employee shall ... disclose to any person ... any return information in a form which 
can be associated with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." 
Id. 
The court noted that § 6103(j) also associates "in a form" with reformulation. Church 
ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 161. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(j) (1982) permits the release of statistical 
studies, forecasts and surveys that are the "purpose of the permitted disclosures to Com­
merce, the FTC and Treasury." Section 6103(j)(4) states: 
"Anonymous form" No person who receives a return or return information under 
this subsection shall disclose such return or return information to any person 
other than the taxpayer to whom it relates except in a form which cannot be 
associated with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court commented that § 6103(j) clearly indicates that "in a 
form" "envisions ... not merely the deletion of an identifying name or symbol on a docu­
ment that contains return information, but agency reformulation " Church of 
Scientology, 792 F.2d at 160-61. 
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reformulation, the Haskell amendment also relates to reformulation. 
The court concluded, therefore, that the Haskell amendment requires 
agency reformulation of return information into statistical studies or 
some other composite product before it can be disclosed. 
The court rejected the IRS' argument that the only type of refor­
mulation the Haskell amendment exempts is that envisioned by 
§ 6108. 151 The court stated that this interpretation would render 
§ 6108 superfluous because that statute already allows for the release 
of non-identifying statistical studies. 152 The court conceded that any 
interpretation ofthe Haskell amendment will create some redundancy, 
but found no textual basis for limiting the phrase "in a form" to statis­
tical studies or compilations. 153 The IRS pointed to Senator Haskell's 
remarks,154 as it had done in King v. IRS,155 in support of the "statisti­
cal studies" interpretation. 156 The court found that these remarks 
were not intended as a comprehensive expression of the purpose of the 
amendment and should not be treated as such. 157 The court further 
rejected the IRS' argument by noting that in addition to statistical 
studies, Senator Haskell referred to the tax model. The court stated 
that the tax model is not a statistical tabulation but a sample return, 
derived from an actual return but reformulated to substitute new 
figures for certain items.15S For these reasons, the court rejected the 
IRS' arguments as well as the interpretation adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in King. 159 The court in Church of 
151. Section 6108 permits the release of non-identifying statistical studies and compi­
lations. See supra note 59. 
152. Church o/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 161. 
153. Id. at 163. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
155. See supra text accompanying note 109 for discussion by the King court. 
156. "The purpose of this amendment. .. [is to allow] the IRS [to] continue to re­
lease for research purposes statistical studies and compilations of data, such as the tax 
model, which do not identify individual taxpayers." 122 CONGo REc. S24,012 (1976) 
(statement by Sen. Haskell). 
157. Church 0/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 161. 
158. Subsequent to the original opinion, issued in slip form, the American Civil Lib­
erties Union filed with the court a post-motion amicus brief. That brief noted that the Tax 
Model, in 1976, was an actual tax return with identifying information redacted. As Judge 
Wald, in dissent, pointed out: "The correct description of the Tax Model at the time of 
passage definitively demonstrates that both the interpretation advanced by the government 
and the majority are wrong, and that all that the framers of the Amendment thought neces­
sary in § 6103 was effective redaction." Id. at 175-76 n.7 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
159. King determined that the "Haskell amendment provides only for the disclosure 
of statistical tabulations which are not associated with or do not identify particular taxpay­
ers." Id. at 163 (citing King, 688 F.2d at 493). The court in Church 0/ Scientology rea­
soned that even if § 6108 were interpreted in such a way that "statistical" does not modify 
"compilations," the tax model is "by no stretch of the imagination a 'special' compilation 
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Scientology held that the Haskell amendment requires, "in addition to 
the fact of nonidentification-some alteration by the government of 
the form in which the return information was originally recorded."l60 
The court noted that reformulation will typically consist of statistical 
tabulations but is not limited to that form. 161 
The court concluded that the meaning it assigned the Haskell 
amendment was the "meaning most faithful to the text,(162] most com­
patible with the remainder of the legislation,(163] and most supportable 
by a plausible legislative(164] intent."165 
prepared 'upon written request by a party or parties,' as § 6108 requires." Id. at 162. See 
supra note 86. 
160. Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 163. The court decided that it need not 
define all manners of reformulation. It noted, however, "that mere deletion of the tax­
payer's name or other identifying data is not enough, since that would render the reformu­
lation requirement entirely duplicative of the non-identification requirement." Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 138-47. 
165. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 163. Judge Silberman, writing a concurring 
opinion, stated: "I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it overrules Nuefeld. But I 
cannot join the opinion insofar as it rejects the agency's interpretation of the statute in 
favor of the majority's own." Id. at 164 (Silberman, J., concurring). Judge Silberman began 
by briefly reviewing the varying interpretations of the Haskell amendment set forth by the 
IRS, the plaintiff, and the majority opinion. Judge Silberman disagreed with the majority's 
description of the IRS' interpretation of the Haskell amendment. He contended that the 
IRS interpreted the Haskell amendment as allowing for the disclosure of data "rendered 
anonymous by amalgamation into general statistics" (citing Appellee's Supplemental Brief 
at 9, Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane). Id. 
Judge Silberman noted that "each of these interpretations is ... a reasonable construction 
of a difficult statute." Id. However, Judge Silberman rejected the majority's decision to 
treat its own construction as authoritative. He stated: 
If the congressional intent of a statute [is not apparent] the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984». 
Judge Silberman concluded that Chevron's instructions apply to 26 U.S.c. § 6103 
(b )(2) (1982) and that no one would be better qualified than the Secretary to decide what 
information may be released under the Haskell amendment. Id. 
Judge Scalia concluded, for the majority, that the court should not defer to the IRS' 
interpretation because that interpretation was inconsistent with the agency's actions. Judge 
Scalia noted that the IRS' position was that the Haskell amendment is simply another 
§ 6108 "statistical studies" provision. However, this was inconsistent with the IRS' plans 
to continue the release of the Tax Model, which is not a statistical study. Because the IRS' 
actions were inconsistent with its analysis of the Haskell amendment, Judge Scalia decided 
that the court should not defer to the IRS' interpretation. Id. at 162 n.3. 
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Judge Wald, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's analysis. 166 
She argued that the text and the plausible legislative intent of the Has­
kell amendment, as well as the relationship between that amendment 
and other sections of the Code, support a reaffirmance of the interpre­
tation adopted by the court in Nuefeld. 167 The dissent concluded that 
the items listed in § 6103(b)(2) that can be disclosed in a manner that 
does not identify a taxpayer are not "return information."168 
In support of the "identity test" interpretation, the dissent ana­
lyzed the text of the Haskell amendment and disagreed with the ma­
jority's "in a form" analysis on several grounds. First, according to 
Judge Wald, "in a form" indicates that substantive types of informa­
tion listed in § 6103(b)(2) are not "return information" if they can be 
disclosed in a manner that cannot identify a taxpayer. The dissent 
claimed that Congress intended the amendment to mean that "return 
information" "does not include data that, by itself or even in conjunc­
tion with other information, cannot be used to identify a taxpayer."169 
Second, the dissent asserted that had Congress intended to create a 
reformulation requirement it would have used much clearer lan­
guage. 170 The dissent noted that nothing in the Haskell amendment 
supported the majority's interpretation that the amendment created 
two requirements, one, non-identification and two, reformulation.17I 
Third, the dissent argued that even if Congress did intend to create a 
reformulation requirement, the majority should not assume that delet­
ing identifying information is not a type of reformulation. 172 In its 
original form, the dissent argued, the information is in a form that 
identifies. However, after deletions the information is in a form that 
does not identify.173 
166. Id. at 172 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. For purposes of this note the Nue/eld approach is synonymous with the 
"identity test." 
168. Id. at 178. Judge Wald noted that "even information disclosable under § 6103 
is, of course, still subject to possible exemptions under one or more of the nine FOIA 
exemptions 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)." Id. at 178 n.ll. 
169. Id. at 174. 
170. Id. at 175. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. The majority took issue with the dissent's analysis of the phrase "in a 
form." The majority noted that it would be "curious usage" to describe an item of "return 
information" as having one form when that information contained names and addresses 
and a different/orm when the names and addresses were deleted. Id. at 157. Judge Scalia 
held that "in a form" evinces a reformulation requirement. Id. See supra text accompany­
ing notes 148-49. In the majority opinion Judge Scalia wrote: "It would be most peculiar 
to catalogue in such detail, in subparagraph (A) of the body of the definition, the specific 
items that constitute return information ... while leaving to an afterthought the major 
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The dissent also analyzed the plausible legislative intent of the 
Haskell amendment. The dissent explained that the "identity test" in­
terpretation comports best with Congress' intent to balance the inter­
est in taxpayer privacy with the interest in disclosure, whenever 
taxpayer's privacy rights are not implicated. 174 As the dissent noted, 
the majority's interpretation would forbid the disclosure of 
§ 6103(b)(2) data, in its present form, to legitimate groups and schol­
ars even if the IRS were confident that there would be no risk of iden­
tification.175 This result is contrary to Congress' intent in 
promulgating the FOIA, which was to increase public access to gov­
ernment records. 176 The Church ofScientology interpretation results 
in a broad exception to the FOIA and limits disclosable information to 
that which is non-identifying and reformulated. 
The dissent also analyzed the broad statutory context of the Has­
kell amendment. Judge Wald determined that the "identity test" in­
terpretation renders superfluous certain provisions of § 6103.177 She 
noted, however, that the majority's interpretation also renders super­
fluous some provisions. 178 Given the fact that both interpretations 
render neighboring provisions superfluous,179 Judge Wald observed 
qualification that none of those items counts unless it identifies the taxpayer." Church of 
Scientology, 792 F.2d at 176 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 157) (emphasis added). 
Judge Wald, however, believed that the Haskell amendment was an afterthought and that 
the majority's reliance on the phrase "in a form" ignored legislative reality. Id. 
Judge Scalia disagreed with the dissent's analysis. Judge Scalia concluded that since 
the provisions were enacted simultaneously, there was no justification for relying on the 
hastily considered nature of the Haskell amendment. [d. at 159. Judge Scalia remarked: 
The ... Haskell amendment was not adopted separately and distinctly from the 
other provisions that we seek to reconcile with it .... [Ilt was not an amendment 
to a preexisting law, but an amendment to the bill as originally presented on the 
floor. Congress did not pass into law the Haskell amendment by itself, but as part 
and parcel of an exceedingly detailed and complex legislative scheme, on which it 
had "labored arduously over each choice of word and each comma." 
Id. 
174. Id. at 172 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
175. Id. at 173. The majority's interpretation required that the information be refor­
mulated in addition to being non-identifiable. Id. at 157. See supra text accompanying note 
137. 
176. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
177. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 176 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. (citing 26 U.S.c. § 6103(j)(4) (1982) ("return information" is not to be re­
leased "except in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify ....")); 26 
U.S.c. § 6103(i)(7)(A) (1982) ("return information" is not to be released "except in a form 
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify .... "). 
179. The dissent noted that although the Haskell amendment would appear to 
render 26 U.S.c. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1986) superfluous if the "identity test" were to be 
adopted, that is not the case. Apparently the dissent concluded that if the sole purpose of 
§ 6103(b)(2)(A) were to list items of "return information," then the Haskell amendment 
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that Congress apparently "did not concern itself with the fact that 
some of the provisions were being made stylistically inelegant."lso 
The dissent concluded that the "superfluity" argument could not sup­
port either the majority's or the dissent's interpretation. lSI 
In addition to analyzing the text, legislative intent, and broad 
statutory context of the Haskell amendment, the dissent discussed the 
"informed requester" problem. The dissent acknowledged that 
although it is difficult to determine just when enough information has 
been deleted to make the taxpayer unidentifiable,ls2 the IRS should be 
granted considerable deference in determining, on a case by case basis, 
what data could lead the informed requester to identify a taxpayer. 183 
Judge Wald noted that the "informed requester" problem is not 
unique to the IRS. She noted that exemptions four, six, and seven of 
the FOIA all implicate the "informed requester" problem but, as the 
majority pointed out, Congress was willing to tolerate the "risk of oc­
casional unknowing disclosure."ls4 The dissent contended that courts 
have developed standards and procedures that deal with the "in­
formed requester" problem ISS and that a court could accept documen­
would be redundant. Church 0/ Scientology, 792 F.2d at 176 (Wald, J., dissenting). The 
panel opinion itself noted that the list in § 6103(b)(2)(A) serves a purpose. The panel opin­
ion held that the items not listed in § 6103(b)(2)(A) should be treated no differently than 
any other item requested under the FOIA. Church 0/Scientology, 792 F.2d 143. 
180. Church o/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 176 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent and 
the majority engaged in a dispute over the "score" of the superfluity of the amendment. 
The judges added up the number of times the "identity test" (accepted by the dissent) 
would render superfluous the provisions of § 6103 and how many times the "reformula­
tion" requirement would render superfluous those same provisions. The dissent argued that 
if the court were to adopt its interpretation the score would be five to three in favor of the 
majority's approach, but that this is irrelevant because given the fact that both interpreta­
tions would be rendered superfluous by § 6103, the superfluity argument could not carry 
the day for either side.Id. at 176 n.8. The majority disagreed with the dissent's count and 
argued that the score would be nine to two in favor of the majority if the Long interpreta­
tion were adopted. Id. at 158 n.2. 
181. Id. at 174 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 173. 
183. Id. 
184. This is evidenced by the fact that the FOIA allows for the release of any "rea­
sonably segregable portion of a record ... after deletion of the portions which are exempt 
under this subsection" even though there is a risk of privacy breach. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) 
(1982); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982); 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(7) (1982); see supra note 5. The 
dissent rebutted the majority's argument that Congress, though "willing to tolerate the 
'risk of occasional unknowing disclosure' " for FOIA disclosures, was unwilling to do the 
same for other classes of information. Church 0/ Scientology, 792 F.2d at 177 (Wald, J., 
dissenting) (citing id. at 158). Judge Wald argued that the CIA exemptions show that Con­
gress clearly knows how to exclude certain classes of information from the FOIA. The 
dissent concluded that if Congress wanted to eliminate any risk of privacy breach regarding 
tax information, it would have done so. Id. 
185. Id. at 177 ("[W]hat constitutes identifying information regarding a subject ca­
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tation to aid in preventing indirect identification.186 Judge Wald noted 
that this would be similar to the requirement the panel opinion im­
posed on the IRS with respect to documents not listed in § 6103. 187 
III. ANALYSIS 
Two court of appeals judges, Scalia and Wald, using the same 
criteria (text, broad statutory context, and legislative history) arrived 
at two different interpretations of a one sentence amendment, thus il­
lustrating the difficulty in interpreting the Haskell amendment. Both 
the court in Long 188 and the court in Church ofScientology 189 failed to 
settle convincingly the question of what is included in "return infor­
mation."190 When the United States Supreme Court decides Church 
of Scientology it could find that either interpretation is reasonable. 
Both interpretations attempt to reconcile their results with the broad 
statutory context of § 6103 and Congress' intent in adopting the Has­
kell amendment. The results, however, are quite different in that the 
det must be weighed not only from the viewpoint of the public, but also from the vantage of 
those who would have been familiar, as fellow cadets or Academy Staff, with other aspects 
of his career at the Academy.") (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 
380 (1976); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that the CIA 
was justified in not disclosing information since "[w]e must take into account ... that each 
individual piece of intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in 
piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious 
importance in itself"), quoted approvingly in S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 
(1983); Schonberger v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 508 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.D.C. 1981) ("the 
material cannot be redacted in a manner that would protect the identity of the individual 
whose privacy interest is at stake"». 
186. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d at 177 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Church of 
Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, (D.C. Cir. 1986) (panel opinion». 
187. Id. In the panel opinion that accompanied this case, Judge Scalia wrote that if 
the Commissioner asserted that the requested information is non-disclosable under § 6103, 
he or she must make the requisite showings "with an affidavit sufficiently detailed to estab­
lish that the document or group of documents in question actually falls into the exempted 
category." Id. at 152. 
188. Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). 
189. Church ofScientology, 792 F.2d 153. 
190. Because the "statistical studies" interpretation adopted in King is not reason­
able, this analysis is limited to the interpretations set forth in Long and Church of 
Scientology. A number of factors contribute to the unreasonableness of the King decision. 
First, the King court ignored the language of the Haskell amendment which does not con­
template limiting return information to statistical studies. Second, in proposing the amend­
ment Senator Haskell referred to the Tax Model which is not a statistical study. See supra 
note 158 and accompanying text. Third, the "statistical studies" interpretation renders 
§ 6108 superfluous. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. Fourth, the narrow inter­
pretation the King court assigns the Haskell amendment is contrary to the purpose of the 
FOIA. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20. 
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"identity test" will result in more non-identifying information being 
released than will the "reformulation" approach. 
This difference is illustrated by applying these interpretations to a 
single set of facts and examining the result. For example, a request for 
the check sheets used in the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Pro­
gram would be treated differently under the two interpretations. 191 
Check sheets contain information from individual tax returns includ­
ing the "taxpayer's name, address, social security number, and all the 
financial data reported on the tax return."192 In applying the "identity 
test" to this request the IRS would redact that information which 
identifies the individual to whom it pertains. The remaining non-iden­
tifying information would then be released. In complying with the 
"reformulation" requirement the IRS would, at that point, take all the 
non-identifying information and create a new compilation of data 
prior to release. The "reformulation" requirement would result in the 
IRS creating a new document, something which it is under no obliga­
tion to do in order to comply with FOIA requests. 193 Therefore, if a 
compilation of this non-identifying information does not previously 
exist the IRS is under no obligation to release that information. This 
approach would result in less non-identifying information being 
released. 
As the dissent in Church of Scientology pointed out, there are 
some problems with the majority's "reformulation" interpretation. 194 
Similarly, as the majority in Church ofScientology pointed out, there 
are a number of problems with the Long 195 interpretation (adopted by 
Nuefeld 196 and endorsed by the dissent in Church ofScientology). 197 
The Church ofScientology interpretation produced a result which 
is incompatible with congressional intent. The court's holding, in ef­
fect, requires that "return information" be reformulated twice prior to 
191. This request is similar to the one in Long, 596 F.2d 362. See supra text accom­
panying notes 35-36. 
192. Long, 596 F.2d at 364. 
193. Id. at 365-66 (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975». 
Merely deleting identifiable information from a requested document does not create a new 
document. Id. at 366. 
194. Church a/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 172-78 (Wald, J., dissenting). For example, 
Judge Scalia never stated what type of reformulation was required. He also neglected to 
determine from what original form the reformulation must be done. See supra text accom­
panying notes 132-65. 
195. Long, 596 F.2d 362. 
196. Nuefeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 165-86. For example, the Long interpreta­
tion renders a number of § 6103 provisions superfluous. See generally Church 0/ 
Scientology discussion concerning Long, supra text accompanying notes 133-47. 
300 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:269 
disclosure; first, when the IRS records, onto a different form, the infor­
mation from the actual tax return l98 and second, when the IRS refor­
mulates that information as suggested by Judge Scalia. 199 The theory 
that reformulation would give added assurance against indirect identi­
fication ignores the fact that "return information" will be "reformu­
lated"2°O prior to disclosure even if the Haskell amendment had not so 
provided. The "reformulation" interpretation provides added assur­
ance of non-identification, but only for informed requesters. For a re­
quester who is not "informed," reformulation does nothing more than 
deleting identifying information would do. That is, deletion of identi­
fying information would render other information non-identifying. 
Since Congress has accepted the risk of an "informed requester," it is 
not likely that Congress provided a requirement of reformulation sim­
ply to provide added assurance of non-identification in the case of an 
"informed requester." 
The "identity test" balances the taxpayers' interest in privacy 
with Congress' interest in disclosure under the FOIA. The result of 
the "identity test," however, was not intended by Congress. If the 
"identity test" is the correct interpretation, then Congress, in adopting 
the amendment, changed "return information" from all items listed in 
§ 6103(b)(2)(A) to those items only when they identify. Congress 
passed the amendment with no objection or discussion from the Senate 
floor; 20 I congressional intent to effectuate such a major change thus 
appears implausible. Indeed, Senator Haskell did not mention chang­
ing the meaning of "return information" in proposing the amendment. 
Examining the broad statutory context arguments which support 
the "reformulation" as well as the "identity test" interpretations does 
not aid in determining which interpretation is better. In support of the 
"reformulation" interpretation, Judge Scalia noted that the phrase "in 
a form" is used in other subsections of § 6103 only when the provision 
is referring to reformulated information.202 However, the logical in­
ference to be drawn from that argument is that Senator Haskell was 
aware of and remembered the exact language of § 6103(j)(4) and 
§ 6103(i)(7)(A). This is not likely in light of the hurried nature in 
198. Section 6103(a) prohibits the disclosure of actual tax returns, therefore "return 
information" must be redacted from that original document. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1982). 
199. Church o/Scientology, 792 F.2d at 163. This reformulation would occur after 
the identifying information is deleted from the document. 
200. This reformulation would occur when the IRS redacts requested information 
from the actual tax return. 
201. 122 CONGo REC. S24,012 (1976). 
202. Church of Scientology of Cal. V. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987). 
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which the amendment was proposed and adopted. Judge Scalia. 
opined that it was improper to consider the nature of the legislative 
history of the amendment because the whole provision was enacted at 
the same time,203 but it is reasonable to consider the amendment sepa­
rately because it was not proposed and adopted at the same time as the 
bulk of § 6103. The "identity test" interpretation renders portions of 
§ 6103 redundant. As Judge Scalia pointed out, though, any interpre­
tation creates some redundancy. The fact that the amendment has 
resulted in three separate interpretations and has created areas of su­
perfluity may indicate that the amendment was not well thought out. 
Both the "identity test" and the "reformulation" interpretations result 
from an analytic framework filled with valid arguments, yet both are 
flawed. In determining which of these two interpretations should gov­
ern, it is appropriate to look to the policy considerations underlying 
disclosure. 
The FOIA provides a broad rule of disc1osure.204 Congress ex­
cluded from that disclosure requirement tax return information.205 
Because taxpayers provide the IRS with many intimate personal and 
financial details, "taxpayer[s] [have] a legitimate interest in maintain­
ing the confidentiality of such matters."206 Individuals have the right 
to control the circulation of information relating to themselves.207 
This right of privacy is not absolute, however, and must be weighed 
against the government's need to disclose certain information. When 
the need for information outweighs the right of privacy, the informa­
tion will be disclosed. 208 
Some209 believe that a threatened breach of privacy will have a 
deleterious effect on our voluntary system of tax assessment.210 How­
203. See supra note 173. 
204. See supra note 5. 
205. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1982) prevents the disclosure of tax return information. 
206. Benedict & Lupert, supra note 10, at 943. 
207. A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971). 
208. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987). 
209. See. e.g., Whitaker, Taxpayer Privacy v. Freedom of Information: Proposals to 
Amend Sec. 6103, 6 TAX ADVISOR 198 (1975); Church of Scientology, 792 F.2d at 158; 
Association of Am. R.Rs. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114, 116 (D.D.C. 1974) (footnote 
omitted). 
210. The District Court for the District of Columbia, in Association of American 
Railroads, held: 
The protection of the data contained in Federal tax returns is an essential part of 
our scheme of taxation. Individuals and corporations have the right to expect 
that information contained in tax returns will not be made available by the gov­
ernment to the public. The policy of confidentiality for income tax data encour­
ages the full disclosure of income by taxpayers in that the individual or corporate 
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ever, because information that would be released under the Haskell 
amendment would not identify a particular taxpayer, the threat of a 
negative effect on our tax assessment system is lessened. In addition, 
substantial civil and criminal penalties are imposed for failing to file a 
completed tax return. 211 
CONCLUSION 
Determining what information would identify an individual tax­
payer and deleting that information prior to release would best com­
port with FOIA policy. There would be more information disclosed 
by using the "identity test" interpretation than using the "reformula­
tion" interpretation. 
Because identifying information will be deleted prior to disclosure 
and because Congress has determined that the benefits of disclosure 
outweigh the small risk of privacy breach, the interpretation set forth 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Long v. IRS 212 is best suited 
to achieve the results intended by Congress in promulgating § 6103 of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Supreme Court, therefore, should 
endorse the "identity test" interpretation created in Long v. IRS and 
proffered, in dissent, by Judge Wald in Church ofScientology of Cali­
fornia v. IRS. 
Elena M Gervino 
taxpayer is assured that his neighbor or competitor will not be apprised of the 
intimate details of his financial life. 
Association ofAm. R.Rs., 371 F. Supp. at 116. 
211. See I.R.C. §§ 6651-52 (consequences of failure to file); 7201-15 (criminal sanc­
tions concerning obligation to file return and to pay taxes). 
212. Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 369 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 
(1980). 
